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ECONOMIC CRISES AND POLICY CHANGE 
IN THE EARLY 1980s: A FOUR COUNTRY 
COMPARISON 
John Hogan 
This article examines the impact of economic crises on macroeconomic 
policies in the United States (US), Mexico, Ireland, and Sweden at the 
start of the 1980s, framed within the context of the policy change 
literature.  These countries are selected for examination as they 
encompass presidential, parliamentary, republican, constitutional 
monarchical, federal and unitary systems of governance.  Two are 
European states and two are from the Americas: two are large economies 
while two are small.  
 
Each country’s response to the crisis affecting it, tempered by historical 
and political factors, provides an insight into that political economy.  
These findings enable us compare and contrast the nature of each crisis 
and the policy responses adopted.  The value of such comparison is the 
perspective it offers, contributing to the goal of building a body of 
increasingly complete explanatory theory (Mahler 1995).   
The Policy Change Literature 
Policy change is complex and must be seen in the context of societal and 
political change (Feldstein, 2002).  A crisis implies prevailing policies 
cannot be sustained without deterioration.  An economic crisis can 
influence the public’s policy preferences, leading to policy change 
(Stevenson, 2001: 621).  Due to the complexities in trying to understand 
policy change, the issue has been approached from a variety of 
perspectives. 
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‘Advocacy coalition theory’ focuses on coalitions sharing core policy 
beliefs, and on policy-oriented learning, to explain radical policy change 
(Meijerink, 2005: 1061).  The ‘epistemic communities’ explanation has a 
rather different emphasis, focusing on networks of individuals who share 
policy relevant knowledge as they seek to achieve policy change (Haas, 
1992: 3).  According to the advocacy coalition approach, for policy 
change to occur, an external shock is required (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Simth 1999).  The epistemic community approach provides insights into 
the roles of information and learning processes in the development of 
regimes, and addresses the mechanisms through which new ideas and 
knowledge relating to problems and policy options may influence policy-
making, leading to policy change (Meijerink, 2005: 1063). 
 
Based on the concept of windows of opportunity, the ‘policy streams’ 
approach to policy change incorporates a role for policy entrepreneurs in 
engendering change (Kingdon, 1995). Windows of opportunity arise 
partly due to exogenous shocks (Garrett and Lange, 1995).  For policy 
change to occur, when a window of opportunity forms, policy 
entrepreneurs attempt to gain political support for the solutions they put 
forward (Zahariadis, 1999).  To do this, policy entrepreneurs link 
problems, ideas, and politics to draw attention to issues and bring them 
onto government agendas (Mintrom and Norman, 2009: 655). 
 
For Baumgartner and Jones (1993), the process of policy change is 
marked by long periods of stability disrupted by instances of radical 
change.  Their ‘punctuated equilibrium’ framework explains policy 
stability by the existence of an institutionalized policy monopoly that 
weakens the pressure for change.  However, such a monopoly is not 
permanent (Meijerink, 2005: 1064).  For policy change to occur, 
opponents of extant policy must create new perceptions of the issues at 
stake, and search for support for their new policy ideas (Meijerink, 2005: 
1064).  If they gain support at a high administrative level significant 
policy change may follow.  Once the new policy is widely accepted this 
initiates another period of policy stability as this policy is 
institutionalized and a new policy monopoly begins.  The ‘critical 
junctures’ framework, developed by Hogan and Doyle (2007), 
formalized this argument.  It posits that a critical juncture is made up of 
sequential events: crisis, ideational change, and policy change.  
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A growing body of literature is devoted to identifying ‘incremental 
policy change’.  This recognises continuity during upheavals, and 
gradual change in times of peace that eventually become transformative 
(Thelen, 2004: 292).  Institutions and policies change in subtle, but often 
significant ways, by a variety of mechanisms, including layering, 
conversion, displacement and drift.  Layering is the placing of new 
constituents in established institutional frameworks.  Conversion is the 
integration of new groups into institutions, forcing change in the roles 
these institutions perform.  Displacement occurs when new models 
emerge, calling into question existing organizations, whereas drift refers 
to the absence of institutional stability (Thelen, 2004).  As Sheingate 
(2003: 186) argues, to provide a nuanced account of policy change we 
must move beyond the conception of institutions as bastions of policy 
stability. 
 
Thus, the policy change literature looks primarily at the importance of 
external shocks in initiating policy change.  However, policy change may 
be triggered by uncertainty as to internal problems in the economy.  The 
key players identified in the policy change literature are policy and 
political entrepreneurs, and coalitions of actors sharing a common belief.  
The key concept in the policy change literature is ideas - extant ideas that 
underlie existing policies, and alternative ideas that undermine current 
policies.  This literature should provide insights into developments in 
each of the countries examined.     
Crisis in the USA 1980/1981: the State of the Economy  
From the late 1960s, US domination of world commerce began to wane 
as the country labored under the burden of deficits from the Vietnam 
War, the Great Society program, an explosive expansion of the 
workforce, unemployment, growing foreign competition, and the impact 
of the oil shocks.  During the 1970s Presidents Nixon and Ford 
attempted, and failed, to curb inflation and cure the recession. 
Democratic Party candidate Jimmy Carter was elected President in 1976.  
At first, Carter pursued expansionary fiscal and monetary policies to 
reduce unemployment, but a surge in inflation halted this.  Oil price 
increases resulting from the Iranian revolution in January 1979 initiated 
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the decade’s second oil crisis.  As inflation climbed, Carter’s approval 
rating fell to just 21 percent (Wayne, 1992: 260). 
 
The need to reduce inflation constricted the expansionary agenda and 
induced friction between Democratic policymakers and their interest 
group allies.  Inflation drove the administration towards introducing 
wage and price guidelines, and tighter fiscal and monetary policies, 
which the trade unions abhorred.  As the experience of the Callaghan 
government in Britain suggests, the exigencies of the international 
economy at this time produced tensions, and sometimes confrontations, 
between social democratic governments and their core constituencies 
(Krieger, 1986: 25). 
 
In 1980 inflation in the US rose to 15.2 percent (see Appendix A).  
Federal Reserve Board (Fed) Chairman Paul Volcker believed the 
remedy was tightening the money supply (Krugman, 1990).  In March 
1980, the President invoked the Credit Control Act, asking the Fed to 
impose new controls on consumer credit, including credits cards (Dark, 
1999: 120).  However, when consumers promptly responded to the new 
incentives there was an inadvertently large reduction in consumer 
borrowing, producing a significant decline in economic growth, which 
slowed to 0.3 percent during the first months of the year1 (see Appendix 
A) (Byron 1980a: 44).  By late May the Labor Department announced 
the purchasing power of the American worker was at its lowest since 
1972.  In early June 1980 the Fed sought to lower the discount rate from 
13 to 12 percent, while the prime lending rate dropped to 14 percent, 
down from 20 percent only 2 months before.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Economic Accounts, 
http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp?Popular=Y. 
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Figure 1 shows that all measures of GDP growth were stagnant, while 
GNI per capita growth collapsed between 1979 and 1982.   
Figure 1: Indicators of Economic Performance, US (1973-1983) 
 
Source: DataGov (http://www.iadb.org/DataGob/), Governance Indicators 
Database 
The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) declared the US in 
recession in June 1980 (Time, 1980a: 48), while the Commerce 
Department reported leading economic indicators had suffered their 
largest declines in a generation.2  By August the Fed was reporting that 
the country’s factories had operated at 74.2 percent of capacity in July, 
their lowest level in five years.3 
 
                                                 
2 The Washington Post, 1 June 1980, p. A1. 
3 ibid., 19 August, p. D6.  
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By the second half of 1980 the administration’s responses to the 
recession smacked of crisis-management.  President Carter’s $32.2 
billion stimulus package, unveiled in early September, was criticized as 
‘a weak smorgasbord of morsels instead of a bold strategy.’4  The 
proposed tax reductions were seen as admission that incomes policy was 
incapable of coping with inflation.5 
 
The tighter Fed policy, and associated higher interest rates, provoked 
Carter to condemn Volcker.  Although the White House supported 
Volcker’s struggle with inflation, Carter had grown concerned over the 
impact of interest rates on his re-election bid.6  The Fed’s shifting 
monetary policies – slowing growth of the money supply to restrain 
inflation, then permitting it expand to prevent the recession getting out of 
hand, before tightening the money supply again – propelled the economy 
into a downward spiral (Church et al., 1981: 44).  Prominent economists 
criticized the Fed’s actions, saying they cast doubt on whether it intended 
to meet its commitment to slow the growth of the money supply to 
combat inflation.’7   
 
Despite declaring the economy to be in recession8, Volcker wanted high 
interest rates to keep a rein on the money supply and curb inflation.9  The 
Fed ultimately pushed interest rates to their highest levels in a century, 
slowing borrowing by businesses and individuals alike, and sending the 
housing and automobile industries into a decline (Time, 1980a: 50).  
‘Through the joint actions of the Reserve Board and the administration, 
the economy had been inadvertently plunged into the kind of major 
recession the White House had been trying to avoid’ (Dark, 1999: 120).  
This situation had consequences for the global economy through the 
transmission of higher US interest rates abroad, and the reduction in the 
US consumption of goods and services from the rest of the world.  Of the 
other countries examined here, Mexico was to prove particularly 
vulnerable to these events in the US. 
                                                 
4 The New York Times, 2 September 1980, p. 12. 
5 ibid., 5 October, 1980, p. 8. 
6 The Washington Post, 3 October 1980, p. A1. 
7 The Wall Street Journal, 2 October, 1980. 
8 ibid., 20 November 1980, p. B1. 
9 ibid., 23 September, p. D1. 
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Crisis in the USA 1980/1981: the Policy Response 
The imposition of controls on consumer credit contributed to the 
economy’s slide and widespread dissatisfaction with government policy 
(Byron 1980a: 44).  The economy was in what Arthur Okun called ‘the 
great stagflation swamp’ (Byron 1980b: 17).  Alan Greenspan observed 
that, in allowing the economy to deteriorate, Carter was forced into a 
crash program of restraint that led to a rise in unemployment (Byron, 
1980b: 19).  Critiques of extant policy coalesced around alternatives 
purporting to tackle the economy’s ills, in particular monetarism. 
 
The monetarist ideas of Milton Friedman and Robert Lucas, as 
propounded by the American Enterprise Institute, had been present in 
political circles since the early 1970s (Blyth 1997: 236–37).  Such 
organizations ensured that economic journalism propagated their 
theories, with the Wall Street Journal acting as ‘effective synthesizer and 
chief proselytizer for these ... ideas’ (Blyth 2002: 164).  Thus, a clear set 
of alternative ideas, and policy entrepreneurs were present.  Aspiring 
Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan embraced this 
ideology. 
 
Reagan’s message was to reduce taxes, spending on social services, 
government regulations, and the size of government, to balance the 
budget – a supply-side approach.  Growth would be achieved by 
removing the barriers perceived to be preventing private enterprise from 
flourishing.  He also favoured increased defense spending and efforts to 
encourage the collapse of Communism.  Where Barry Goldwater failed 
in 1964, Reagan was convinced he could triumph.  He blamed the 
Democrats’ inflationary policies for stifling productivity.  The causes of 
the 1970s inflation were far more complex than simply the growth of the 
money supply due to increased federal spending (contributory factors 
including falling productivity, declining value of the dollar and rising oil 
prices) but Reagan, acting as Friedman’s translator, put things in this 
monetarist context (Madrick, 2009: 6). 
 
During the final stages of the election Reagan declared Carter’s record on 
inflation and unemployment ‘a failure on a scale so vast, in dimensions 
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so broad, with effects so devastating, that it is virtually without parallel’ 
(Church, 1980: 17).  Reagan attacked Carter for permitting a doubling in 
the so-called misery index (Okun’s discomfort index) that Carter had 
badgered Gerald Ford with during the 1976 campaign10 (Time, 1980b: 
45).  Through this approach Reagan forged an electoral coalition around 
the idea of monetarism and supply side economics (Blyth 1997). 
 
On 4 November Reagan was elected President in a neo-conservative 
avalanche that carried 44 percent of the trade union vote11, traditionally 
some of the Democrats strongest supporters.  The new administration’s 
economic policies were different from those of its predecessor in their 
political roots and theoretical foundations (OECD, 1982a: 9).  To combat 
stagflation Reagan promoted a painless panacea: tax cuts based on the 
supply-side proposals of Arthur Laffer, and deregulation, wherein the 
resulting stimulus would boost revenues to balance the budget, reducing 
inflationary pressure.12 
 
The new President’s program, dubbed Reaganomics, constituted the 
belief that American capitalism, freed from the burden of taxes and 
regulation, would surge ahead.  Reagan’s first budget proposed $750 
billion in tax cuts over three years, while cutting $11 billion from public 
works, job training programs, and unemployment benefits (Jones, 1995: 
597).  According to the OECD (1982a: 24) ‘a trend towards reduced 
economic regulation was carried further by the immediate application of 
the remaining stages of crude oil price decontrol and the abolition of the 
Council on Wage and Price Stability.’  However, Reagan did not so 
much reduce the tax burden as shift it, with the fall in income tax being 
complemented by an increase in payroll taxes for social security 
(Madrick, 2009: 21).  His programmes effectively called for a shift in 
spending in favour of defense at the expense of welfare. 
Reagan, acting as political entrepreneur, capitalized on anti-government 
sentiment, emphasizing individualism and a smaller Federal role.  Tax 
                                                 
10 The misery index, a crude measure of the intensity of the ‘stagflation’ problem, is the 
sum of the unemployment rate at any point in time and the annual rate of inflation in that 
year. 
11 The Washington Post, 16 February, 1981, p.  A1. 
12 For a discussion of Laffer’s economics, see White (1983). 
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relief was allied to a restructuring of federal expenditure, bringing sharp 
changes in the fiscal influence on the economy.  Reagan won the election 
by having a discernible set of alternative ideas which could replace 
extant arrangements.  The result was interpreted as a clear mandate for 
neo-conservative policies (OECD 1982a: 10).   
 
The strains building on the US economy during the 1960s came to a head 
in the 1970s in the wake of a series of exogenous shocks.  The Carter’s 
administrations weak and indecisive response to the economic crisis 
provided a window of opportunity for Reagan, acting as political 
entrepreneur, to link his ideas on lower taxes, deregulation, and reduced 
government spending to the problems in the economy.  A strong 
advocacy coalition developed around Reagan’s ideas.  His election, and 
the alternative policies he implemented, punctuated the policy 
equilibrium that had existed under his predecessors. 
Crisis in Mexico 1981/1982: the State of the Economy  
After the Second World War, Mexico implemented an import 
substitution policy, protecting the agrarian and consumer goods sectors 
behind import quotas (González, 2005).  The model succeeded as there 
was significant external demand for Mexican raw materials despite its 
trade barriers.  However, it created a private sector dependent upon state 
protection (Hernandez, 2008)13.  Import substitution in the 1960s was 
superseded by a policy referred to as stabilizing development.  This 
approach focused on enhancing productivity and competitiveness 
(McCaughan, 1993).   
 
In an effort to grow the economy in the wake of the first oil shock, the 
government increased expenditure and its level of intervention (Lustig, 
1992).  However, this, combined with negative agricultural supply 
shocks (decreases in supply in the US) that turned the terms of trade in 
favour of Mexican agriculture, led to inflation reaching 20 percent in 
1974 (Moreno-Bird and Ros, 2009: 129).  When President López Portillo 
                                                 
13 Interview (July 2008) with Luis Miguel Beristain Hernandez, PhD in Administrative 
Sciences;  Business and Politics professor, Director of Professional Development, 
Enterprise Development and Social Development at ITESM. 
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came to power in 1976, he inherited a balance of payments deficit, 
sectorial instability and socioeconomic inequalities threatening political 
stability (Alarcon and McKinley 1992).  This legacy was due to the 
combined effects of rapid population growth, the 1973 oil crisis (Mexico 
was a net oil importer at the time), the global recession, and falling 
agricultural exports.  The middle class had become disillusioned with its 
inability to express itself in a political culture dominated by one party – 
the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).  These influence signalled 
the end of the stabilising development phase (Rubio, 2008).14 
 
However, in 1978 Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), the state oil company, 
discovered huge oil reserves and, with the second oil crisis in 1979, an 
oil boom followed (McCaughan 1993). The hope was oil revenues would 
stabilize the economy (Calderón-Madrid, 1997).  While the danger of 
immediate crisis was circumvented, the economy’s structural problems 
remained unresolved (Nelson, 1990: 95). 
 
Once Mexico became a net petroleum exporter, pressure grew to expand 
public spending (Bailey, 1980).  ‘Rather than pay the political price that 
sweeping redistributive policies – especially tax reform – would have 
entailed, the Portillo administration (1976-1982) sought to expand the 
economic pie and increase the role of the state in the economy’ 
(Cornelius, 1985: 88).  As the number of state-owned enterprises 
quadrupled, expenditure outstripped petroleum revenues and an anaemic 
taxation system (Calderón-Madrid, 1997).  To finance these projects 
Mexico borrowed $78bn. by 1981 (Alarcon and McKinley, 1992).  The 
economy began to overheat, and as inflation surpassed 25 percent in 
1981 the peso became overvalued and the competiveness of exports, 
apart from oil, diminished (McCaughan, 1993).   
 
Recession in the US reduced demand for Mexican goods, while a sharp 
reduction in the US money supply increased interest rates, and put 
pressure on Mexico’s debt servicing, as US banks had lent the country 
$25 billion. Servicing Mexico’s total debt reached $16 billion in 1982, 
more than its revenues from oil (Cornelius, 1985: 89).  As oil prices fell, 
                                                 
14 Interview (July 2008) with Luis Rubio, PhD in Political Science; Mexican writer on 
politics, and economics.  
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in response to a weakening international economy, PEMEX declared oil 
production would be insufficient to reactivate the economy.15  
‘Collapsing oil prices and rising international interest rates erased 
Mexico’s prosperity’ (Starr, 2006: 53).  The critical error by the Mexican 
government had been to regard increasing oil prices as a permanent 
feature of the international economy, while increasing interest rates were 
regarded as a temporary phenomenon (Moreno-Bird and Ros, 2009: 
135). 
 
By 1982, as confidence in the economy waned, Mexicans began 
converting pesos to dollars at a rate of 25 billion pesos a day (Sancton et 
al., 1982: 40).  The gravity of the situation came to international attention 
on August 13, 1982, when:   
 
The government fired the shot heard around the world, 
announcing that it could not meet interest payments coming 
due within the next few days and initiating negotiations for 
bridge loans and rescheduling agreements with the US 
Treasury, the IMF, and the private commercial banks. 
(Nelson, 1990: 97)  
 
GDP contracted by 0.6 percent in 1982 and 4.2 percent in 1983 (see 
Appendix A).  As Figure 2 shows, all measures of GDP were in decline 
by the early 1980s, while GNI per capita growth underwent the largest 
collapse of the countries examined. Output fell in all industries,16 
unemployment jumped towards 15 percent,17 while more than 20 million 
people – half the workforce – were underemployed (Cornelius, 1985: 
92).  Compounding matters, US banks stopped lending to Mexican 
companies, as they owed US$600 million in unpaid interest.18  The 
budget deficit stood at 16.5 percent of GDP.19   
                                                 
15 Magazine Nexos, Sociedad, Ciencia y Literatura,. January, 1982.  “De Díaz Mirón a Díaz 
Serrano”. 
16 ibid. 
17 ibid, 20 December, 1982. 
18 ibid, 1 January, 1983. 
19 ibid., 20 December, 1982. 
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Figure 2: Indicators of Economic Performance, Mexico (1974-1984) 
 
 
Source: DataGov (http://www.iadb.org/DataGob/), Governance Indicators 
Database. 
 
Despite GDP growing at 8 percent annually between 1978 and 1981, this 
was to prove the worst crisis to hit Mexico since the Great Depression 
(Edwards, 1995: 17).  Opinion polls found great scepticism concerning 
the economy (Basañez, 1985).  Whereas the 1970s had seen an influx of 
foreign direct investment (FDI), the early 1980s witnessed its flight 
(Edwards, 1995). 
Crisis in Mexico 1981/1982: the Policy Response 
By mid March 1982, President Portillo’s administration was scrambling 
to save the economy (Taylor and Lopez, 1982: 38).  During the 1982 
presidential election all contenders focused on the crisis.  However, 
opposition parties were not sufficiently strong to challenge the PRI’s 
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previously hegemonic position.  Miguel De La Madrid, a fiscal 
conservative, was the PRI’s candidate.20  He was ‘among the leaders of 
the conservative faction based in the treasury’ (Nelson, 1990: 98).  His 
selection constituted a rupture with the PRI’s rhetoric of revolutionary 
ideology (Cárdenas, 2008)21.  With society in turmoil free market 
advocates wanted a President who would support the rights of private 
property (Luna et al., 1987). 
 
In his inaugural address President De La Madrid declared a new 
economic approach was needed.22  However, ‘policy options and 
instruments appeared limited [for Mexico], which as a debtor was subject 
to the conditionality imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’ 
(Golob, 2003: 375).  The fact that the IMF was dictating policy indicates 
that political entrepreneurship for Mexico had moved from the domestic 
to the international context.  Sources of external finance had dried up in 
the aftermath of the crisis.  Even when oil prices rose, the industry did 
not have the capacity take advantage.  De La Madrid wanted to take 
policy to the Right, stabilizing and opening the economy (Lustig, 1992: 
28).  The new government sought to promote exports (Looney, 1985: 
112).  For decades free trade had been ‘the policy option that dare not 
speak its name’ (Golob, 2003: 370).  An austerity program – Programa 
Inmediato de Reordenacion Economica – was introduced (Lustig, 1992: 
29), along with a draconian budget for a 50 percent deficit reduction23. 
 
The government ‘embraced an approach toward liberalisation, 
privatisation and deregulation’ (Pastor and Wise, 1997:  421).  However, 
a major concern was Mexico’s inability to compete in foreign markets, 
and its inadequate level of saving.24  The administration signaled its 
desire for foreign direct investment (FDI) by relaxing investment 
restriction (Cornelius, 1985: 115), permitting Mexican businesses to 
                                                 
20 ibid. 5 October, 1981. 
21 Interview (July 2008) with Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. Mexican politician, active in Mexican 
politics in the 1980s and important political representative of Mexico’s opposition parties 
(Partido de la Revolución Democrática [PRD]).   
22 First Annual Presidential Report of President Miguel De La Madrid, 1September, 1983. 
23 ibid.   
24 Latin America Regional Reports, 4 June, 1982, pp. 1-2. 
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form international partnerships (Tournaud, 2008).  These policies had a 
significant impact upon economic and social development.   
During 1982, the peso was devalued twice as a means of increasing 
exports (Katz, 1994).  However, the exchange rate with the US dollar 
collapsed from 23 peso to the dollar in 1980 to 143 in 1983.  De La 
Madrid also sought a less confrontational approach with the IMF 
(Nelson, 1990: 63).  ‘Acceptance of the IMF embrace [was] a major 
break-through’ (IGS, 1982: 1720), as it permitted Mexico avoid a debt 
moratorium (Looney, 1985: 121).  The reduction in government spending 
enabled Mexico to reach its IMF targets for reducing the public sector 
deficit.  However, this had a recessionary impact as fiscal and monetary 
solutions proposed by the IMF and OECD (changing from import 
substitution to export promotion) failed to take account of the global 
contraction (Allen et al., 1992). 
 
De La Madrid recognized that his administration could not rely on oil 
exports.25  The solution to financing development was sought through 
privatizing public enterprises, with almost 900 of the 1,155 state-owned 
enterprises in 1982 being sold off over the following decade (Hernandez, 
2008).  This was one of the largest privatization programs ever 
undertaken (Chong and López-de-Silanes, 2004).  Thus, De La Madrid 
sought to combine macroeconomic stabilization and structural change 
with a focus on export orientated manufacturing (Cornelius, 1985: 110).   
 
Although these austerity measures resulted in labour unrest, the 
relationship between the private sector and the state was transformed 
over the 1980s.  Neoliberal reforms made the private sector a key player 
in reviving the economy (Beristain, 2008).  Business organisations 
became actively engaged in debates over economic policy, where 
previously the private sector had been kept at a remove (Golob, 2003: 
371).  As a result, business confidence improved.  These events allowed 
for the creation of new societal organisations, and interest groups that 
sought an input into policy making.   Thus, Mexican economic history 
can be divided into before, and after, 1982 (Cárdenas, 2008). 
 
                                                 
25 The Third World Magazine, December, 1983, p. 72. 
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By the mid 1970s, the Mexican economy was experiencing severe 
challenges.  President Portillo’s administration used the discovery of oil 
as a means of expanding state enterprises while avoiding structural 
reforms.  However, state expenditure outpaced oil revenues and drove up 
debt.  When oil prices collapsed in the early 1980s Mexico was unable to 
service these debts.  Recession in the US reduced demand for Mexican 
exports while pushing up interest rates.  President De La Madrid imposed 
the austerity measures his predecessor had avoided and opened the 
economy to foreign competition.  The collapse of oil prices constituted 
an exogenous shock contributing to economic crisis, ideational change 
and radical policy change - a critical juncture in Mexican economic 
policy.   
Crisis in Ireland 1981/1982: the State of the Economy 
The latter years of the 1970s saw the Irish economy performing relatively 
strongly.  The previously high levels of inflation and unemployment had 
begun to fall, while growth returned (Leddin and Walsh, 1998: 26).  Real 
GDP increased by 5.3 percent per annum between 1976 and 1979 
(OECD, 1982b: 8).  However, this recovery proved fleeting due to a 
combination of factors.  The Fianna Fáil government that came to power 
in 1977 employed an expansionary fiscal policy when the economy was 
growing at an unsustainable rate (OECD, 1982b: 10).  Strong pro-
cyclical fiscal policies led to deterioration in fiscal balances, with the 
public sector-borrowing requirement increasing from 13 percent of GNP 
in 1976 to 20 percent in 1981.  This exacerbated inflationary pressures, 
and resulted in record deficits in the current external balance and the 
public sector accounts (OECD, 1983: 7).  The structural problems 
highlighted during the first oil crisis had remained unresolved.  The 
government implemented more expansionary measures in 1980 due to 
the worsening international economic climate and stagnating domestic 
demand.  However, instead of stimulating the economy, these 
expansionary measures contributed to inflation rising to 18.2 percent (see 
Appendix A).  As the economy shrank unemployment and emigration 
increased.   
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Reducing inflation, eliminating government borrowing and providing 
increased incentives for industry were seen as essential to righting the 
economy.  However, adjustment to the European Monetary System 
(EMS), which Ireland entered in 1979, initially failed to reduce inflation.  
In 1981 domestic demand remained weak, while all measures of GDP 
were stagnant (Figure 3).  Additionally, GNI per capita growth declined 
between 1980 and 1982. Unemployment reached 9.3 percent, with 
manufacturing industry experiencing a fall in output of 2 percent and the 
loss of 10,000 jobs, while the building industry was also in recession 
(NESC, 1981: 1-3).  The rates of unemployment and inflation rose 
towards historically high figures (see Appendix A), despite government 
commitments to full employment.   
Figure 3: Indicators of Economic Performance, Ireland (1973-1983) 
 
Source: DataGov (http://www.iadb.org/DataGob/), Governance Indicators 
Database 
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The fiscal deficit, intended to be temporary, became impossible to 
eliminate in an economic climate of decline.  By 1981 the Irish national 
debt reached £10.2 billion, of which £3.7 billion was external (Leddin 
and Walsh, 1998: 155-156).  The public sector borrowing requirement 
peaked at 20.1 percent of GNP, the national debt stood at 80 percent of 
GNP, while the budget deficit stood at an arguably equally unsustainable 
7.3 percent of GNP (Leddin and O’Leary, 1995: 167).  The balance of 
payments deficit was 13 percent of GNP.26  Almost half of Exchequer 
borrowing in 1981 went to financing the current budget deficit (Bacon et 
al., 1982: 6).  Fianna Fáil’s policies contributed to reducing growth from 
over 5 percent in 1977 to effectively zero by 1981, and in the same 
period doubled the national debt.  The government’s spending was so 
high that the total amount budgeted for 1981 had been consumed by June 
of that year. 
The need to control public expenditure, reduce the deficit and prevent 
excessive reliance on foreign borrowing dictated the adoption of tighter 
fiscal policies.  However, the catch-all nature of Irish political parties 
induced governments to buy off short-term pressure from interest groups 
through ad hoc policy concessions.  This worked against consistency in 
imposing severe economic policies and formulating enduring agreements 
between the state and economic interest groups like those found in 
Continental neo-corporatism.   
Crisis in Ireland 1981/1982: the Policy Response 
The 1981 general election saw a minority coalition government of Fine 
Gael and Labour replace Fianna Fáil.  At a most inopportune time, the 
country found itself condemned to a period of weak and unstable 
government.  The new administration sought to bring order to the public 
finances, constraining rising public service pay more tightly than its 
predecessor.  The supplementary budget introduced in July 1981 was 
designed to reduce the central government borrowing requirement and 
the balance of payments deficit.  However, being a minority 
administration made it difficult for the government to maintain it 
policies. 
                                                 
26 Central Bank of Ireland, Annual Report, 1982, p. 16.  
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Economic and political instability peaked in 1981-1982.  Between June 
1981 and November 1982 three general elections each brought a change 
of government.  The minority Fine Gael-Labour Coalition fell on budget 
day 1982.  It was succeeded by a minority Fianna Fáil administration in 
March.  In autumn 1982 the Fianna Fáil’s government’s cutbacks 
alienated the independent deputies supporting it and the government 
collapsed.  By 1982, as balancing the budget became critical, all political 
parties agreed on the need to stabilize the debt/GNP ratio (Mjoset, 1992: 
381).  Apart from crisis-induced cutbacks, no coherent ideas/policies 
emerged, however, as the governments of this period were of such short 
duration and unstable character.   
The general election of November 1982 was won by a majority Fine 
Gael-Labour Coalition which remained in power until 1987.  By then, 
with national debt exceeding GNP and the current budget deficit 
spiralling out of control, a coherent corrective policy was essential.  The 
state of the public finances permitted the government little scope for 
action other than austerity measures.  All political parties became 
committed to curbing public expenditure as an essential precondition for 
economic recovery.  However, the Coalition government experienced 
difficulty in devising an effective strategy (O’Byrnes, 1986: 219). 
The deflationary medicine was first applied in early 1983 with cutbacks 
in health spending and the public capital programme (O’Gráda, 1997).  
However, with the economy stagnating, unemployment more than 
doubled between 1980 and 1985.  As a result, government spending on 
social services jumped from 28.9 percent of GNP in 1980 to 35.6 percent 
by 1985 (Leddin and Walsh, 1998: 302).  Control over current spending 
proved difficult, with high unemployment and rapid population growth.  
By the mid 1980s the economy was in a downward spiral, with high 
taxes and interest rates depressing investment and productive capacity.  
The state of the economy over 1980-1985 marked a major discontinuity 
with the experience of the 1970s.  By the mid-1980s unemployment was 
being offset by emigration. 
In 1987 the national debt reached 130 percent of GNP.  Nevertheless, 
over its lifetime the Fine Gael-Labour coalition succeeded in cutting 
inflation from 17 percent to less than 4 percent, while the public sector 
borrowing requirement was almost halved to 13 percent of GNP.  The 
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macroeconomic policies introduced in the late 1970s - and political 
recklessness - led to unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances.  
Additionally, the Fine Gael wing of the coalition government decided 
that the social partners had no right to influence economic policy.  Thus, 
the centralized agreements (between the trade unions, employers, and 
government) that, by the late 1970s had acquired a macroeconomic 
significance as wide-ranging wage and policy accords were ended, as the 
government considered them incompatible with reduced spending (Cox, 
1983).  As a result, many interest groups, especially the trade unions, 
found themselves removed from the corridors of power.  The period 
1980 to 1987 was one of prolonged recession, falling living standards, 
high unemployment and emigration.   
 
By the late 1970s the Irish economy was in deep difficulty due to a 
combination of adverse circumstances and political misjudgments.  Pro-
cyclical policies contributed to inflation, while the economy stagnated 
and unemployment rose.  However, instead of confronting the problems 
head on, the Fianna Fáil government sought to neutralize opposition by 
means of ad hoc policy concessions to various interest groups.  The 
period 1981-82 was dominated by three changes of government, each 
incapable of implementing coherent policies.  The coalition government 
that came to power in late 1982 struggled to right the economy, with 
cutbacks dominating its economic policies. 
Crisis in Sweden 1981/1982: the State of the Economy  
By the mid 1970s Sweden was experiencing stagflation.  This situation 
contributed to the Swedish Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokratiska 
Arbetarepartiet (SAP)) losing of power in 1976, for the first time in 44 
years.  The SAP had been the most successful political party in any 
Western European democracy over the preceding four decades.  
Thereafter, the SAP shifted towards the centre of the political spectrum.  
The non-Socialist coalition-government that came to power in 1976, 
made up of the Centre Party, Liberals, and Moderate Party, 
commissioned reports on the economy that were infused with ‘the rising 
currents of monetarism, public choice theory, and neo-liberalism that 
were to come to the fore in the coming decade’ (Andersson, 2006: 101).  
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In spite of the adjustment policies pursued by the authorities, correction 
of the imbalances that had built up since the 1970s was slow, and the 
economy remained unstable (OECD, 1984: 7).   
Growth in public expenditure outstripped economic growth (OECD, 
1984: 9).  The public sector’s share of GNP rose under the non-Socialists 
(1976-1982), so that, by 1982, public sector expenditure constituted 67 
percent of GNP (OECD, 1990: 59).  This development contributed to the 
number of public sector jobs increasing by 43 percent between 1972 and 
1982, and coming to outnumber those in private industry after 1978 
(Gress, 1988).  Labour productivity growth slowed substantially from 
about 1970.  Lindbeck (1997: 1312) argues that sluggish aggregate 
productivity growth in Sweden after 1970 was, to some extent, the result 
of the large size of the public sector and the slow labour productivity 
growth. 
 
This had a knock-on effect on the level of exports, which stagnated over 
the decade (Ryden and Bergstrom, 1982).  Worryingly, Sweden’s share 
of the world economy dropped 40 percent during that decade (Peterson, 
1987).  Foreign competition made substantial inroads on the Swedish 
domestic market, as suggested by the steady rise in the share of imported 
manufactured goods (OECD, 1984: 12).  
 
Central government’s expenditure grew at a faster pace towards the end 
of the 1970s than it had at the beginning of the decade, while revenues 
stagnated.  Budget deficits were financed through borrowing.  However, 
there was no political mandate for radical budget cuts or revenue 
enhancements.  To avoid internal disputes, the non-Socialist Parties in 
government wanted neither to raise taxes nor be accused of trying to 
dismantle the welfare state (Branegan, 1982: 32). 
 
In 1981, inflation hit 12.1 percent and unemployment reached 3.1 percent 
in 1982, its highest level since 1945 (see Appendix A).  Although this 
would have been a low figure elsewhere, it was regarded as a scandal in a 
country accustomed to full employment (Apple Jr., 1982: 3).  However, 
many economists believed that the real level of unemployment, including 
the jobless in training programs, workers forced into early retirement and 
those who had given up seeking employment, was closer to 16 percent 
(Branegan, 1982: 32).   
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For Swedes this was an unprecedented situation.  Economic growth, 
which had averaged 2.5 percent annually throughout the 1970s, 
contracted in 1981 and expanded by only 1 percent in 1982.  Figure 4 
shows that all indicators of GDP growth were low in the early 1980s, 
while GNI per capita growth collapsed.  In the context of the 
international recession, the budget deficit prevented the government 
pursuing a counter-cyclical fiscal policy.  
Figure 4: Indicators of Economic Performance, Sweden (1974-1984) 
 
 
Source: DataGov (http://www.iadb.org/DataGob/), Governance Indicators 
Database 
 
With a sluggish economy, stagnant revenues and rising expenditures, the 
government’s budget deficits accelerated during the 1970s, reaching 13 
percent of GNP in 1982 (Siven, 1984).  The Riksbank predicted that ‘the 
deficit on the national budget would grow from around SKr78 billion 
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under the 1982-83 budget to some SKr90 billion in 1983-1984’ 
(Dullforce, 1982: 1).  ‘In an international context, both the level of the 
budget deficit and the swing in the budget balance since the mid-1970s 
has been more pronounced than in most other OECD countries’ (OECD, 
1982c: 16).  The Swedish debt/GNP ratio increased by over 250 percent 
in the six years between 1976 and 1982. 
Crisis in Sweden 1981/1982: the Policy Response 
In autumn 1981 the krona was devalued by 10 percent and, in the spring 
of 1982, the non-Socialist coalition government introduced an austerity 
program.  The 1982 election was dominated by talk of economic crisis 
(Osnos, 1982: A15).  During the campaign, the SAP, under Olof Palme, 
attacked the viability of the country having another non-Socialist 
government.  The SAP presented a ‘Crisis Programme’ on how Sweden 
could save and work its way out of crisis.  The economic problems and 
internal cabinet crises within the ruling coalition deprived the 
government of credibility (Mjoset, 1992) while the opposition SAP 
gained in popularity (Hadenius, 1997: 129-30)..  SAP won the election 
with its set of proposals to improve the economy.   
 
The new SAP government implemented a recovery program: the Third 
Way (Apple Jr., 1982: 3).  It argued that renewed growth required 
redistribution of income from labour to capital.  This marked a major 
change in SAP economic planning, behind which lay the influence of its 
research department which, since 1976, had achieved ascendancy over 
the Trade Union Confederation’s (Landsorganisationen i Sverige (LO)) 
research department within the labour movement (Meidner, 1993).  The 
subsequent cuts in the public sector resulted in deep divisions between 
the SAP and LO (Andersson, 2006: 116). 
 
The Third Way, as an attempt to maintain a level of social democracy, 
was a wide-ranging stabilization program encompassing demand 
management measures as well as initiatives to promote structural change 
and ensure an equitable distribution of the burden of adjustment (OECD, 
1984: 21).  The SAP was determined to pour funds into job-creating 
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industries and to increase taxes for that purpose.  The party planned to 
spend $100 million and hoped to attract an addition $350 million in 
private investment, aiming to create 30,000 jobs (Apple Jr., 1982: 3).  
The centerpiece of Finance Minister Kjell-Olof Feldt’s strategy was a 
devaluation of the krona by 16 percent in early October 1982.27  This was 
implemented in conjunction with a price freeze and increases in sales and 
corporate taxes, comprising a sweeping ‘crisis plan’ (Dullforce 1982: 1).  
The SAP identified labour costs as key to international competiveness. 
 
The LO, the largest union association, accommodated devaluation by 
demanding average wage increases of 2.5 percent in ensuing bargaining, 
so as not to undermine the government’s strategy.  The devaluation, 
together with international economic recovery, resulted in high earnings 
and export expansion (Ahlén, 1989: 333).  The thrust of SAP policies 
pointed in a different direction than previously, with Feldt determined to 
give priority to private sector initiatives, growth and profits.  Under 
pressure for more individual freedom and the internationalisation of the 
economy, these reforms saw the SAP move in a neo-liberal policy 
direction (Taylor, 1991: 17).   
 
Meanwhile, fiscal policy was held tight and the slimming of the public 
sector would, it was argued, create ‘crowding in’ effects (Mjoset, 1992: 
349).  The public sector austerity strategy, with a profit explosion and 
wage restraint, created tension between the SAP and LO.  Nevertheless, 
the government restored welfare entitlements cut by the former non-
Socialist coalition governments (OECD, 1984: 23).   
 
To placate the LO, the SAP introduced wage-earner funds in 1983, 
despite opposition from the Swedish Employers’ Federation (Svenska 
Arbetsgivarforening (SAF)) opposition.  In 1976 the LO had proposed a 
levy on corporate profits to transfer control of enterprises with more than 
50 employees to the unions.  However, the implemented version had 
been heavily modified from the original proposal, transforming ‘from an 
overtly socialist union proposal to a number of toothless share holding 
funds’ (Meidner, 1993: 223).  This modified version dissatisfied the LO 
                                                 
27 Financial Times, 12 October, 1976, p. 1. 
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(Lewin, 1985: 296).  To maintain the welfare state the SAP had 
prioritized private sector growth.  The Third Way marked a reversal in 
the SAP’s perspective on social policy, moving from an emphasis on 
investment in growth to an emphasis on cost reduction (Andersson, 2006: 
124).     
 
In response to the problems in the economy, the SAP presented its Third 
Way proposals for public expenditure cuts and prioritizing the private 
sector.  This strategy, while damaging the SAP’s relationship with its 
trade union allies, contributed to Swedish economic expansion in 
conjunction with an international economy recovery.  The economic 
crisis provided a window of opportunity for the SAP to implement new 
economic policies that altered the established policy approach that had 
existed over the preceding decades.  For Kjellberg (1992: 88) this 
marked the demise of the Swedish Model.  
Conclusion 
In examining the four countries’ policy responses to economic crises, 
tracing their origins to the ending of the long post-war boom in the 
1970’s, this article highlights the interdependence of politics and 
economics.  Conducting this examination within the context of the policy 
change literature assists our understanding of the process of policy 
change.   
 
The long-term decline of the US economy, combined with the inability 
of successive administrations to damp inflationary pressures building 
since the late 1960s, led to an economic crisis.  In response, Ronald 
Reagan, playing the role of political entrepreneur and at the head of an 
advocacy coalition consisting of a range of policy entrepreneurs, used the 
window of opportunity that the crisis created to take economic policy in 
a different, if not altogether coherent, direction.  Extant economic policy 
was punctuated by reorientating taxes, deregulating the private sector of 
the economy and redirecting public spending away from social welfare 
and towards the military.  During Reagan’s presidency the economy 
recovered and grew robustly. However, the increased national debt 
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proved to be a legacy with which future administrations would have to 
grapple. 
By the 1970s uncompetitive industries and a growing population placed 
severe strains on the Mexican economy.  The discovery of oil in the late 
1970s seemed a panacea, generating revenue that was used to finance 
public sector expansion.  Additional finance came in loans from the US, 
which, by the early 1980s, was in recession with high interest rates.  This 
scenario led to the reduction in demand for Mexican exports while 
dramatically adding to the cost of servicing its US borrowings.  In 
response, the PRI government moved to the Right under President De La 
Madrid.  This transformation in Mexican economic policy constituted a 
critical juncture. 
 
In Ireland, a combination of the global downturn, and pro-cyclical fiscal 
policies in the late 1970s brought the economy to its knees.  By 1981 the 
national debt, budget deficit and inflation rate were approaching record 
levels.  Being catch-all in nature, the Irish political parties had difficulty 
imposing harsh economic policies, in spite of the window of opportunity 
the crisis presented.  Neither a political entrepreneur, nor an advocacy 
coalition, emerged to champion radical policy change.  Throughout 
1981/82, governmental instability impeded the implementation of a 
coherent approach to righting the economy.  It was 1987 before the 
economy began to recover, albeit even then slowly. 
 
In Sweden, the impact of the global downturn on domestic economic 
growth provided the SAP government with the opportunity to break out 
of the policy model that had developed over the preceding generation.  
The SAP shifted economic policy to the centre with The Third Way 
programme.  This programme, placing priority on private sector growth 
and initiative while shrinking the public sector, was seen as necessary to 
make the economy more dynamic, and growth oriented.  The emphasis of 
economic policy shifted away from Swedish-style socialism. 
 
For each county the problems with its economy came to a head in the late 
1970s.  In the US and Mexico, Presidents Reagan and De La Madrid, 
presenting themselves as political entrepreneurs, took economic policy to 
the right.  In Sweden the SAP moved toward the center with its Third 
Way programme.  In these countries the economic crises provided 
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windows of opportunity for policy changes to occur.  However, in 
Ireland political instability and fear of alienating sections of the 
community meant that, when finally confronted in the late 1980s, the 
scale of the economy’s problems had become enormous.  It was 
remarkable then that a dramatic economic turnaround occurred in Ireland 
after 1987 and ushered in two decades of unprecedented progress and 
prosperity.  The Irish governments of the late 1980s and early 1990s 
displayed an exceptional determination to reduce the size of the national 
debt and budget deficits, while also ensuring low inflation, and industrial 
relations tranquillity.  National pay agreements contributed significantly 
to the improved industrial relations climate and the transformation in the 
public finances.  This was a blast of fiscal rectitude impelled by the 
necessity of putting the public finances in order, so as to preserve 
Ireland’s economic sovereignty (Burda, 1997). 
 
The cases examined here are not purely of historical interest.  They serve 
to illustrate the cross national diversity of crisis experiences and 
responses that always has to be recognised in political economy analysis.  
In the wake of the current global financial crisis we have been presented 
with the spectacle a range of countries, as well as sub national 
jurisdictions, struggling to prevent economic collapse.  Iceland has seen 
its financial system fail spectacularly; Greece is in the midst of political 
and economic turmoil that has raised serious questions about the future 
of both the Euro and the wider European Project.  There are growing 
concerns about the sovereign debt situations in Portugal, Spain, and 
Ireland.  California, ground zero for the US subprime mortgage debacle, 
is being referred to as a failed economy and state (Harris, 2009: 32).  
Thus, the historical issues considered in this paper have a significant 
contemporary echo. 
 
John Hogan lectures in international political economy in the College of 
Business, Dublin Institute of Technology.   
 
john.hogan@dit.ie 
 
The author thanks Professor Frank Stilwell and the JAPE team of 
reviewers for all of their work and feedback on this manuscript. 
132     JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY  No 65 
Appendix A: Economic Date for the Four Countries 
Country/ 
Year 
Unemp. Infl.  Debt/ 
GNP  
ratio 
GDP 
Growth 
Rates  
Interest  
Rates 
USA      
1979 5.7 11.3 33.1 2.4 13 
1980 7.0 13.5 33.3 -0.3 15 
1981 7.5 10.4 32.5 2.3 19 
1982 9.7 3.8 35.2 -2.1 15 
Mexico      
1980 4.2 26.36 30.53 9.22 22 
1981 4.2 27.93 32.59 8.77 28 
1982 6.8 58.92 53.3 -0.63 41 
1983 6.9 101.7 66.53 -4.2 60 
Ireland      
1980 7.3 18.2 71.91 1.9 16 
1981 9.9 20.4 77.45 1.1 16 
1982 11.4 17.1 86.53 -0.7 17 
1983 13.6 10.5 97.60 -1.6 14 
Sweden       
1980 2.0 13.7 43.2 1.9 15 
1981 2.5 12.1 50.8 -0.6 17 
1982 3.1 8.6 59.3 1.1 17 
1983 3.5 9.0 64.6 1.8 15 
Sources: Leddin and Walsh (1998); Mitchell (1993); Eurostat Yearbook 1997, 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities; 
Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.1, 
Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP); 
World Bank Group, World Development Indicators WDI Online,  
http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI/. 
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